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MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-ZONING-THE GRANTING OF A VARIANCE
BASED ON UNNECESSARY HARDSHIP-Defendant purchased a tract of vacant
land located in the most highly restricted residence zone of his city. The
local zoning ordinance prescribed minimum area, width, and depth
measurements for building plots in that district. Defendant desired to
subdivide the property into two building plots in order to build a onefamily residence on each plot. Although the first plot complied with the
minimum requirements of the ordinance, the other plot was deficient in
area and depth measurements. Defendant was unsuccessful in his attempts
both to purchase adjoining land and to sell parts of his property to
adjoining owners. He then applied to the local Board of Adjustment for a
variance from the zoning ordinance, claiming hardship because of the
shape of his property. The board granted the variance holding that the
strict application of the zoning ordinance under the circumstances "would
work an undue hardship on the owner." Plaintiffs, property owners in the
immediate neighborhood, contested the validity of the variance. The
lower court affirmed the grant of the variance. On appeal, held, reversed.
The defendant failed to establish a case of undue hardship as required
by the zoning ordinance. Bierce v. Gross, (N.J. 1957) 135 A. (2d) 561.
Since a zoning ordinance cannot possibly meet all the contingencies of
an existing situation, most state enabling acts provide that each community
may establish a local board of adjustm.ent1 with authority to vary the
application of the zoning ordinance in appropriate cases. In substance a

1 The board which grants variances is called a board of appeals or a board of
Teview. The first such board appeared in New York City's pioneer zoning ordinance in
1916 and was called the board of appeals. See BASSElT, ZoNING, 2d ed., lllll-141 (1940).
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typical ordinance provides that a board of adjustment shall have power
to vary the application of the provisions of the zoning ordinance provided
that (1) there are "practical difficulties or unnecessary hardships" 2 caused
by a strict application of the ordinance; (2) such variance is in harmony
with the general purpose and intent of the ordinance; and (3) the public
safety and welfare is assured and substantial justice done.3 Since the
provision requiring "practical difficulties or unnecessary hardships"
constitutes the heart of the variance remedy, most cases relating to variances
are primarily involved with that requirement.4 Although the courts have
not defined the meaning of those terms with certainty, five principles or
standards have emerged from the cases which, to a certain extent, limit
the discretion of a board. First, the ordinance must cause the hardship;
independent factors, such as deed restrictions5 or the inherent nature of
the property, 6 are not subjects for which the variance remedy is intended.
Second, the cases indicate that the property owner must, in effect, show
that he is precluded from making any reasonable use of his property.7
This factor-that the property is not suitable for use as zoned-appears
to be the most important as well as the most practical consideration in
determining the existence of unnecessary hardship. 8 Contained in this
second standard is the almost universal statement by the courts that
financial disappointment alone, 9 including loss of profits10 or prohibition of

2 Some ordinances require "peculiar" or "exceptional" difficulties and "undue,"
"unusual," or "unreasonable" hardships.
3 8 McQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, 3d ed., §25.166 (1957).
4 The standard of unnecessary hardship has been subject to criticism as being too
jmprecise to define: "The words 'practical difficulty or unnecessary hardship' . • . were
not well chosen ••• and their continued use has been very unfortunate. They almost
defy critical analysis." Maltbie, "The Legal Background of Zoning," 22 CONN. B. J. 2 at
-6, 7 (1948).
5 Brackett v. Board of Appeal, 311 Mass. 52, 39 N.E. (2d) 956 (1942).
6 Hickox v. Griffin, 298 N.Y. 365, 83 N.E. (2d) 836 (1949).
7 E.g., Board of Adjustment v. Stovall, (Tex. Civ. App. 1949) 218 S.W. (2d) 286. See
Green, "The Power of the Zoning Board of Adjustment To Grant Variances from the
Zoning Ordinance," 29 N.C. L. R.Ev. 245 (1951).
s Otto v. Steinhilber, 282 N.Y. 71, 24 N.E. (2d) 851 (1939) (applicant failed to show
that the property could not be used for the uses permitted in the district); Matter of
Clark v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 301 N.Y. 86, 92 N.E. (2d) 903 (1950) (denial of applica•
tion for a funeral home); Talmage v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 141 Conn. 639, 109 A.
(2d) 253 (1954); Elkins Park Improvement Assn. Zoning Case, 361 Pa. 322, 64 A. (2d)
783 (1949).
9 McMahon v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 140 Conn. 433, 101 A. (2d) 284 (1953);
Rochester Transit Corp. v. Crowley, 205 Misc. 933, 131 N.Y.S. (2d) 493 (1954). The very
purpose of the ordinance would be undermined if financial loss alone justified granting
a variance since all zoning effects some financial hardship in individual cases by depriving the landowner of the most advantageous use of his property. See, e.g., Holy Sepulchre
Cemetery v. Board of Appeals, 271 App. Div. 33, 60 N.Y.S. (2d) 750 (1946); Dooling's
Windy Hill v. Springfield Township Zoning Board of Adjustment, 371 Pa. 290, 89 A.
(2d) 505 (1952).
10 Benson v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 129 Conn. 280, 27 A. (2d) 389 (1942); Devaney
v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 132 Conn. 537, 45 A. (2d) 828 (1946).
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the most profitable use of the property,11 will not justify a variance. However, since the difference benveen the denial of the right to any reasonable
return and the mere deprivation of profits is a question of degree, financial
hardship is not entirely irrelevant.12 A third standard which is significant
in determining whether unnecessary hardship exists requires that the
hardship caused by the ordinance must be peculiar to the particular
property of the applicant, 13 as distinguished from a hardship common to
the whole neighborhood. 14 If the plight of the owner is due to the general
conditions in the neighborhood, this may indicate that the basic zoning
ordinance is in need of a revision which can be accomplished only by the
local legislative authority.15 A fourth standard states that the applicant
must show that the hardship was not self-inflicted. There are two classes
of cases in this area. One type involves the applicant's violation of the
ordinance, knowing or unknowing, and his subsequent application for a
variance based upon his expenditures as the hardship suffered.16 Unless
the applicant is otherwise entitled to a variance, relief will be denied.
The second type of case concerns the applicant's purchase of land after
the enactment of the zoning ordinance, thus making him chargeable with
knowledge of the restriction imposed on the property. Here the courts
regard the applicant with disfavor since the hardship could have been
avoided by not purchasing the land.17 This latter theory, however, is
subject to fair criticism because it is inconsistent with the idea that the
granting of a variance depends on the nature of the property rather than
its owner. If the property is otherwise entitled to a variance, it seems only
just to grant the variance regardless of the identity of the owner or the
time when he purchased the property. A fifth standard which
influences the courts is that a variance will not be granted which

11 Board of Adjustment v. Stovall, note 7 supra; Pincus v. Power, 376 Pa. 175, 101 A.
(2d) 914 (1954).
12 The courts do weigh this factor in ehe setting of whether the land can yield a
reasonable return if used only for a purpose allowed by the ordinance. See Otto v.
Steinhilber, note 8 supra.
13 Levy v. Board of Standards and Appeals, 267 N.Y. 347, 196 N.E. 284 (1935);
Talmage v. Board of Zoning Appeals, note 8 supra.
H This requirement is further defined by the courts to relate not only to the
applicant's property, but also to the particular premises for which the -benefit of the
variance is sought. Brackett v. Board of Appeal, note 5 supra (applicant, a hotel owner,
sought a variance for an adjoining vacant lot to use as a parking1 lot, but was denied a
variance because the parking problem was a hardship affecting the use of the hotel
lot, not the lot for which the variance was sought); Searles v. Darling, 7 Terry (46 Del.)
263, 83 A. (2d) 96 (1951).
15 Arnebergh, "Variances in Zoning," 24 UNIV. KANS. CITY L. REv. 240 (1956); 8
McQUILI.IN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, 2d ed., §25.165 (1957).
16 Dolan v. Decapua, 16 N.J. 599, 109 A. (2d) 615 (1954); DeFelice v. Zoning Board
of Appeals, 130 Conn. 156, 32 A. (2d) 635 (1943).
11 This factor was strongly a!gued in ,the principal case, the court responding that
it "weighs heavily" against a claim of hardship. Ventresca v. Exley, 358 Pa. 98, 56 A.
(2d) 210 (1948).
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will change the character of the zone in which the property is
located.18 This standard is intimately related to the common legislative
requirement that a variance must be in harmony with the general purpose
and intent of the ordinance. Since the determination of the existence of
unnecessary hardship is necessarily a question of degree, the courts,
in looking closely at the effect of the proposed use on the surrounding area, attempt to balance the equities.19 The application of the
above standards must not be made in a vacuum, but must be interrelated.
This procedure was carried out in the principal case, the court giving
special emphasis to the fact that the defendant could have used his property
for the use permitted in the district and that he purchased with knowledge
of the restriction.
Frank D. Jacobs, S.Ed.

18 Jennings' Appeal, 330 Pa.
19 "Even where hardship is

154, 198 A. 621 (1938); Otto v. Steinhilber, note 8 supra.
shown the board is required to balance such hardship
against the equities and to determine to what extent the variance, if granted, would
interfere 'With the zoning plan and the rights of owners of other property." Rochester
Transit Corp. v. Crowley, note 9 supra, at 937; Holy Sepulchre Cemetery v. Board of Appeals, note 9 supra (court balanced the equities in favor of property owners living a
mile away from a proposed cemetery).

